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Midterm elections are elections in which the American electorate votes for all seats of the 
United States House of Representatives, approximately one-third of the seats in the United States 
Senate, and a majority of state governorships and state legislatures. Many political scientists and 
pundits regard midterm elections as a referendum on the incumbent president, as these elections 
occur midway through the four-year term. Since 1860, the beginning of the modern two-political 
party system, the party occupying the White House loses seats in the Congress, with the 
exception of three elections.
1
 Unfortunately, many scholars neglect the importance of midterm 
elections. In fact, Andrew W. Busch (1999), author of the book Horses in Midstream: U. S. 
Midterm Elections and Their Consequences, 1894 – 1998, described midterm elections as “the 
poor stepchild of American electoral studies in most respects” (1). 
Conventional analysis of midterm elections is usually in relation to the previous 
presidential election, or the issues or events leading up towards a presidential election. Rarely is 
midterm elections considered in terms of whether the president, or his party in some cases, 
would retain the White House in the next presidential election. The focus of this research is to 
determine whether midterm elections can serve as a predictive indicator of the outcome in the 
following presidential election. For decades, scholars have speculated as to why the president’s 
party suffers losses at the midterm election. An examination of these theories can provide insight 
into the variables that should be considered when examining the central question of this research. 
Competing Theories of Midterm Elections 
Coattails and Surge-and-Decline 
                                                          
1
 The three exceptions are the midterm elections of 1934, 1938, and 2002, where the incumbent party gained nine, 
four, and eight seats respectively in the U.S. House of Representatives. There is a fourth election, the midterm 
election of 1902, in which the incumbent Republican party gained nine seats. However, this gain is sixteen seats 
short of the twenty-five seats the Democrats gained, following the increase in the number of representatives 
following the 1900 census. 
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When it comes to midterm elections, there exist two prominent theories that help explain 
why the president’s party suffers losses. The first theory is the “coattails theory.” According to 
this theory, first proposed by Louis Bean (1948), the losses suffered by the president’s party are a 
result of the decline in voter turnout for midterm elections. The voters that voted in the 
presidential election because of a specific candidate are less likely to vote in the off-year 
election; thus, congressional candidates from the president’s party are likely to suffer defeat in 
the absence of presidential coattails (Press 1956, 691). 
Building on the coattails theory is the “surge and decline theory.” According to Angus 
Campbell (1960), who first proposed his theory, a high-stimulus election (an election in which 
issues, events, and/or popular candidates may stimulate widespread enthusiasm and interest 
amongst the electorate) is usually followed by a low-stimulus election (elections in which issues 
or events do not stimulate interest and enthusiasm amongst the electorate for the election). If 
there is enough interest, in any given election, voters who may not usually vote (or voters with 
weak party identification) tend to vote for one party over the other. However, if the election does 
not seem to be important enough, only the typical, dedicated voters will vote (Campbell 1960, 
398-401). Displayed in Figure 1, on the following page, are the major premises of Campbell’s 
theory. 
In order to prove his theory, Campbell focused on patterns and trends in voter turnout and 
partisanship. Campbell (1960) referred to two panel studies, conducted by the Survey Research 
Center, the first of which was a study of the presidential election in 1952 asking participants (1) 
their choice in the election, and, (2) whom they voted for in the previous election. In 1956 and 
1958, the Survey Research Center conducted a second survey, asking the participants about their 
vote choice in both elections. These two national surveys revealed three interesting findings. 
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First, Campbell (1960) classifies the 1952 presidential election as a surge election, due to an 
increase in voter turnout and a swing in partisanship that resulted in Eisenhower receiving more 
votes than Thomas Dewey. Second, Campbell classified the 1956-58 election cycles as an 
electoral decline, due to less political party activity and media coverage than in typical 
presidential elections. In addition, he notes a major swing in partisanship in favor of Democrats, 
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Figure 1: The Theory of Surge and Decline’s Sequence 
(Campbell 1997, 14) 
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Referendum Theory 
Edward R. Tufte (1975) posits the other major theory that attempts to explain why the 
president’s party suffers midterm congressional losses. In response to the original surge and 
decline theory, Tufte tries to explain why it is the case the president’s party loses the number of 
seats as it does (1975, 813). Whereas surge-and-decline is focused mainly on voter turnout and 
the amount of interest and information that is present in the election, Tufte focuses on two 
additional, yet equally important, factors: presidential popularity (Kernell 1977; Piereson 1975; 
Tufte 1975, 813) and national economic performance (Kramer 1971; Stigler 1973; Tufte 1975, 











Using data from 1938 to 1970, Tufte examines his hypothesis through multiple regression 
analysis, using the following equation (Tufte 1975, 817): 
 
Figure 2: Tufte’s Referendum 
Model 
(Tufte 1975, 814) 
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Based on his findings, Tufte concluded that all of the midterm elections of 1938-1970 
were in fact a referendum on the president based on his performance and the management of the 
national economy (1975, 824). Tufte based this argument on his finding that the two independent 
variables—the president’s approval rating and the yearly change in real disposable personal 
income per capita—explained approximately 91% of the variation in midterm election results. 
According to Tufte, a 10% change in the president’s Gallup approval rating equates to a 1.3 
percentage point change in the national midterm congressional vote of the president’s party. 
Tufte also found that a change of $100 in real disposable income in the year prior to the election 
equated to a 3.5 percentage points change in the national midterm congressional vote of the 
president’s party (1975, 817). 
Tufte followed-up on his research in his 1978 book, Political Control of the Economy. 
Here, Tufte shifted the period he was studying; now, Tufte started with the 1946 midterm 
election and concluded with the 1974 midterm election. Now, a 1 percentage point change in the 
growth of real disposable income per capita the year prior to the election equates to a 0.6 
percentage point change in the president’s party’s national congressional vote. Also, a 10 
percentage point change in the president’s Gallup approval poll equates to a 1.3 percentage point 
change in the president’s party’s national congressional vote, the same as when Tufte conducted 
this research in 1975 (1978, 110-2). Tufte’s results led to a shift in scholars’ consideration of 
how the president’s party loses midterm congressional races. This shift in focus to referendum-
type voting deflated the importance of the surge-and-decline theory. 
A Proliferation of Theory 
Tufte’s research paved the way for more analysis regarding the subject of midterm losses 
for the president’s party. In 1981, Jacobson and Kernell proposed the strategic politicians’ 
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theory. Here, Jacobson and Kernell argue that the decisions of politicians regarding whether they 
will seek office, or how they run their campaign, are factors in voters’ minds come Election Day. 
In 1984, Lewis-Black and Rice proposed a referendum theory similar to Tufte’s, except instead 
of using disposable income as the economic measure, they used the growth rate of the Gross 
National Product (GNP) six-nine months prior to the election. However, critics of their model 
argue that GNP is not an accurate indicator. In 1991, the Bureau of Labor Statistics switched 
from using GNP to using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) because GDP refers to production 
taking place inside the U.S. (Department of Commerce 1991, 8). 
 Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth (1986) reconstructed Tufte’s original referendum 
model, including an additional variable (party competence evaluations), in order to explain why 
the president’s party does considerably worst in subsequent midterm elections, as compared to 
the party’s first midterm election. Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth concluded that because the 
electorate had a more favorable view of the opposing party regarding fixing the nation’s party 
over the incumbent party in subsequent midterm elections, the incumbent party will suffer 
greater losses in subsequent midterm elections than in the first midterm election (1986, 574). 
Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman (1986) also proposed a new theory, exposure theory, 
which is supposed to be highly predictive of turnovers in U.S. House elections (Oppenheimer, 
Stimson, and Waterman 1986, 227). The authors measured exposure as “the excess or deficit 
number of seats a party holds measured against its long-term norm,” (1986, 228). However, 
Gaddie (1997) proposed an alternative to the exposure theory, focusing more on open-seat 
exposure; he calculated this type of exposure as the “net number of open seats the president's 
party has exposed (Open Seatspres - Open Seatsout),” (Gaddie 1997, 706). Erikson (1988) argued 
that the reason the president’s party suffers midterm losses are simply that it is the party 
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currently in control, a restoration of Kernell’s negative-voting theory (1977). Erikson also 
posited the argument that economic conditions did not matter when determining midterm 
elections (1990). However, Jacobson (1990) refuted this conclusion in an article published in 
response to Erikson. 
Restoration and Revision of Surge-and-Decline 
In the late 1980s, there was an attempt to resurrect the surge and decline theory. James E. 
Campbell issued a revised version in 1987 and refined the model in 1991, and refined the model 
once more in 1997. According to Campbell (1987, 968), the difference between his theory and 
Angus Campbell’s (1960) original theory is that, unlike the original theory, turnout of peripheral 
partisans and the voting choice of independents will be affected due to a surge in both interest 
and information. Listed below in Figure 3 is a summary of the differences between the two 







































Figure 3: A Comparison of the 
Original and Revised Theories 
of Surge and Decline in 
Congressional Elections 
(Campbell 1987, 969) 
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Campbell’s revised theory makes the claim that the number of partisans present in the 
electorate for the presidential election and a presidential candidate’s share of the independent 
vote is directly proportional to the magnitude of the short-term forces that favors the president’s 
party (1987, 970). James E. Campbell utilizes linear regression analysis to prove his theory, 
examining the relationship between congressional vote choice and party identification, turnout, 
and the president’s share of the popular vote in the previous midterm election between the years 
1956 and 1982 (1987, 970-1) 
Campbell (1987) concluded that there was a surge effect in the number of partisan voters 
that turned out and a surge effect for information present during the presidential election; these 
surge effects are not present in midterm elections (977-8). In 1991, Campbell issued a revision to 
his version of the surge-and-decline. This time, Campbell expanded his time series to examine 31 
presidential elections and 30 midterm elections between the years 1868 and 1988 (1991). For the 
purposes of this revision, Campbell looked at the relationship between electoral change and the 
president’s popular vote share, controlling for a number of factors, including whether the 
election year was a presidential year or a midterm year (1991, 478-81). Campbell concluded that 
although his findings weakened over a large period, surge-and-decline effects were still present, 
(1991, 484-5). 
Campbell’s (1997) outlines his completed revision of surge-and-decline in his book, The 
Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections. The major elements of Campbell’s revised theory 
are below, outlined in Figure 4. Campbell (1997) explains that his theory, unlike the original 
surge-and-decline theory, takes into account Tufte’s idea that the midterm election acts as a 
referendum on the president’s party (109). Campbell’s revised theory also takes into account 
Kernell and Jacobson’s theory of the strategic politician. Campbell (1997) concludes that the 
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short-term forces affecting the presidential election, other than affecting the decisions of the 
electorate, has the potential for affecting congressional candidates decisions. This includes 
whether an incumbent decides to seek reelection or retire, whether a challenger decides to 
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Figure 4: The Revised Theory of Surge-and-Decline’s Sequence 
(Campbell 1997, 107) 
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Using Midterm Elections Theories to Predict Subsequent Presidential Elections 
Although these two schools of thought attempt to explain why the president would suffer 
losses in the midterm election following his own election, scholars have yet to apply these 
theories to the question of whether midterm elections could be a predictive indicator of 
subsequent presidential elections. Voter turnout and enthusiasm, presidential performance, 
economic performance, and all of the other variables that comprise these two theories are not 
only important in terms of the first two years of the President’s term in office; they also factor 
greatly in the second half of the term as well. Thus, there is a clear causal link between midterm 
and presidential elections. 
However, it is likely that any causal relationship between midterm elections and 
subsequent presidential elections is less clear, because there are so many factors that affect the 
outcome of presidential elections. These factors include, but are not limited to, policy issues, 
candidate favorability, and political ideology. When it comes to predicting presidential elections, 
there is a consensus among scholars that there are two main factors to consider at the time of the 
election: the popularity of the incumbent president, and the state of the economy. In regards to 
the economy, Fair (1978) concluded that the economy, in terms of real economic activity (i.e. 
change in Gross National Product or change in the unemployment rate) affects the voting on 
presidential elections (171). A similar finding came from Erikson (1989), although his measure 
of economic activity was per capita disposable income (568). 
In regards to presidential popularity, some scholars have argued that the incumbent 
president’s approval rating had nothing to do with his reelection chances (Mueller 1973, 197-
202). Others have disagreed by showing evidence of a positive correlation between the 
president’s approval rating in the last poll prior to the election and the actual vote share the 
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president received (Sigelman 1979, 533). Scholars have also incorporated presidential popularity 
to predict the vote share of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party, who is not the 
incumbent president himself (Brody and Sigelman 1983, 328). Thus, presidential popularity and 
the economy are common variables to predict the president’s, and his party’s, chances of 
retaining the White House. Thus, most scholars use the Tufte model, focusing on presidential 
popularity and the state of the economy, when creating their own presidential models. The only 
difference is that whereas Tufte uses real disposable income per capita as the economic indicator, 
presidential election models use GNP (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984, Abramowitz 1988), Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), inflation (Moghaddam and Elich 2009, 460-1), or any combination of 
these three variables to represent the state of the economy. 
Two important questions create the focus of this paper. The first question is the theories 
used to explain midterm election results applicable to predicting subsequent presidential 
elections. If it is the case that these theories are applicable to predicting subsequent presidential 
elections, then the second question is which theory, surge-and-decline or referendum, is the most 
applicable for predicting subsequent presidential elections. It is my contention that midterm 
election theories are applicable to predicting subsequent presidential elections, and that Tufte’s 
referendum model, or a variation of it, is the most applicable for predicting subsequent 
presidential elections. 
Data and Methodology 
In order to test my theory and hypothesis, I estimate three models. The first two models 
approximate the midterm surge-and-decline and referendum theories. The third model is a test of 
my own theory, that the results of the previous midterm elections influence subsequent 
presidential elections. 
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Data from sixteen presidential and midterm elections (1948 to 2010) comprises the 
research. The data does not expand to pre-1948 due to the limited availability of certain 
variables. For example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis only has quarterly data regarding 
personal disposable income as far back as 1947, and Gallup has data on its presidential job 
approval poll as far back as 1937. However, despite these data constraints, having sixteen data 
points to work with is crucial in designing an accurate model for predicting either future midterm 
or presidential election results. 
 The first variable of interest is the number of House seats lost or gained by the 
President’s party in each election, calculated as the difference between the number of seats held 
or won during one election, and the number of seats held or won during the next election 
(HouseSeatGain). Out of the 32 election years examined, House seat gains and losses range from 
a loss of 63 seats in 2010 to a gain of 75 seats in 1948. This variable will serve as the dependent 
variable for the midterm election models, and as the main independent variable for my 
presidential election model. 
The second variable, PresReelect, is simply whether or not the President was re-elected 
(or his party retained control of the White House). This binary variable serves as the dependent 
variable in the presidential election model; it is coded zero (0) for instances in which the 
President lost his reelection bid (or his party lost control of the White House) and one (1) for 
instances in which the President was successfully reelected (or his party successfully retained 
control of the White House). Out of the 16 presidential election years covered, there are eight 
instances where the President won reelection, or his party maintained control of the White 
House, and eight instances where the President lost reelection, or his party lost control of the 
White House. 
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In order to measure the direction and magnitude of the presidential “surge” (Campbell 
1987, 971), I use PresVote, the share of the popular vote received by the winning candidate in 
each presidential election. It is also the independent variable of primary focus to surge and 
decline supporters (Campbell 1985, 1144). Over the course of the past 16 presidential elections, 
the President’s share of the popular vote ranged from 43% in 1992 to 61.10% in 1964. I also 
estimated an alternative measure that accounts for the magnitude of PresVote. Instead of looking 
at just the president’s share of the popular vote in the presidential election, there is also the 
question of how much the president’s share of the popular vote either exceeds, or falls short, of 
the fifty percent benchmark. This variable, MagPresVote, is measured as fifty percent subtracted 
from the president’s percentage share of the popular vote (Campbell 1991, 479). 
Another variable measured is PresApproval, the President’s approval rating prior to each 
election. This data comes from Gallup, with the last poll taken prior to the election ranging from 
September to October
2
, with the President’s approval rating, over the course of this data series, 
range from 25% in 2008 to 74% in 1964. 
I examine two variables that measure economic health. The first, PctChangInc, is the 
percent change in total disposable income per capita (adjusted for inflation), calculated from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Whereas Tufte’s original model utilized the percent change 
in total disposable income for the year prior to the election, this research utilizes the percent 
change in total disposable income for the year the election occurred. The reason for this is the 
election year’s percent change in disposable income is a more contemporary measure to use 
                                                          
2
 It is worth noting that a presidential approval rating was not included for 1936 because the Gallup presidential 
approval poll did not begin until late 1937. In addition, the presidential approval rating for 1944 is not from Gallup, 
it is from an Office of Public Opinion and Research (OPOR) poll taken in August 1944. The presidential approval 
rating listed for 1948 is from a Gallup poll, but the poll in question came from the period of June 18-24. 
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instead of the percent change from the previous year. The percent change of total disposable 
income during election years range from -2.6% in 1980 to 7.5% in 1950. 
The second income variable examined is PctChangInc3rd. Instead of examining the 
yearly percent change in total disposable income, this variable represents the percent change of 
the third quarter results of total disposable income. This figure covers the months of July, 
August, and September, and provides more of an accurate depiction of voters’ “pocketbooks” 
heading into the final month of the election (Jacobson and Kernell 1983, 67). The third quarter 
percent change of total disposable income during election years range from -3.0% in 1980 to 
8.7% in 1950. 
Two more variables I examined reflected the party identification of the voting electorate 
since 1952. PartyIDD and PartyIDR represent the percentages of respondents considering 
themselves Democrats and Republicans, respectively, on a three-point scale. This data comes 
from the American National Elections Studies (ANES) time series surveys from 1952 to 2008.
3
 
These two variables are included in the surge-and-decline model, to represent Campbell’s (1997) 
idea of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans (99-104). During election years, those 
classifying themselves as Democrats range from 47% in 1994 to 62% in 1964. Those classifying 
themselves as Republicans range from 30% in 1978 to 43% in 2002. 
Another variable I examined is ConsumerConf, which measures how confident 
consumers are about the state of the current economy, via the current index, with the index 
normalized to have a value of 100 in December 1964. The data representing this variable covers 
                                                          
3
 Because there was no time series surveys conducted in 2006 and 2010, the numbers from 2004 and 2008 are used 
to represent their respective following election years. 
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years 1951 to 2010, with an election low of 70.4 in 1952, to an election high of 113.0 in 1998.
4
 
This variable is included in the referendum model, to represent voters’ ideas about the economy. 
The final variable I include is CongApproval, representing the Congress’s job approval 
from 1974 to 2010. For the purposes of this research, I used the last poll taken prior to the 
election, ranging from an election low of 17% in 2010 to an election high of 50% in 2002. This 
variable is exclusive to the presidential election model only. 
I also include a dummy variable representing the president’s political party. A “0” 
represents the Republican Party, and a “1” represents the Democratic Party. 
For the purposes of this research, I will construct a model to show that midterm elections 
are a predictive indicator for presidential elections. The model, in its most basic form, resembles 
Figure 5, located on the next page. 
This model illustrates the question: which of the two theories, surge and decline or 
referenda, is a better predictive model for midterm elections? Can midterm election results 
represent an indicator in predicting the president’s reelection chances? The hypothesis born from 
this model is that the results of a midterm election, in conjunction with intervening factor(s), can 
serve as a predictive gauge as to whether the incumbent President will win re-election. 
I incorporated Regression analysis to examine the relationships between these variables. 
Linear regression is used to examine the relationship between House gains/losses and the 
president’s popular vote percentage, President’s approval rating prior to the midterm, and percent 
change in total disposable income. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship 
between whether or not the President is re-elected and the results of the previous midterm 
                                                          
4
 For years 1951-59, the most recent index number prior to the election is used. From 1960 onwards, the average of 
the July, August, and September indices is used. 
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election. Table 1 outlines the different models analyzed, the variables included, and the type of 








Additionally, I provide three correlation matrices for key variables, one for each model 
(see Appendix A). The purpose of these matrices is to see whether there are relationships 


















































This model looks at the relationship between the number of House Seats gained or lost by 
the president’s party at the midterm election and the president’s share of the popular vote from 
the previous presidential election. 
Looking at the correlation matrix for this model, the matrix reveals that the relationship 
between HouseSeatGain and PresVote shows a Pearson correlation value of -0.390, and a p-
value of 0.099. The relationship between HouseSeatGain and MagPresVote shows a Pearson 
correlation value of -0.400, and a p-value of 0.090. The matrix also reveals that the relationship 
between PartyIDR and PresVote shows a Pearson correlation value of -0.444, and a p-value of 
0.098. The relationship between PartyIDR and MagPresVote shows a Pearson correlation value 
of -0.447, and a p-value of 0.095. Although none of the p-values in the correlations fall below 
0.05, it will be interesting in seeing whether these relationships will translate into causal 
relationships in the regression tests. 
Based on the results from the correlations, I conducted eight tests of this model, with 
each test only looking at the midterm election years; resulting in nineteen midterm elections 
examined (fifteen when PartyIDD and PartyIDR included). The results of the eight tests show 
that PartyIDD and PartyIDR had no statistical effect on the number of House seats the 
president’s party lose (or gain) in the midterm election. The tests that appeared to be the best 
representatives of the surge-and-decline model are the tests in which the independent variables 
are either PresVote or MagPresVote, and Party. When the model consists of the variables 
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PresVote and Party, the model has an adjusted R square value of 0.231, with a p-value of 0.048. 
PresVote has a coefficient value of -185.533, a standardized coefficient value of-0.420, and a p-
value of 0.060. Party has a coefficient value of -18.854, a standardized coefficient value of -
0.407, and a p-value of 0.067. For this test, the model explains about 23 percent of the variance 
in the results of U.S. House races during the midterm elections. Regarding the variable PresVote, 
its coefficient shows that the better the president performs in his election, the worse his party will 
perform in the midterm elections in the following midterm election. 
When the model consists of the variables MagPresVote and Party, the model has an 
adjusted R square value of 0.237, with a p-value of 0.045. MagPresVote has a coefficient value 
of -188.345, a standardized coefficient value of-0.425, and a p-value of 0.056. Party has a 
coefficient value of -18.688, a standardized coefficient value of -0.403, with a p-value of 0.069. 
For this test, the model explains about 23-24 percent of the variance in the results of U.S. House 
races during the midterm elections. Regarding the variable MagPresVote, its coefficient shows 
that the better the president performs in his election, the worse his party will perform in the 
midterm elections in the following midterm election. In fact, the president’s party will perform 
worse under this model than the previous model with PresVote. Because of the similarities 
between the results of the two models, it is best to run the presidential model incorporating 
PresVote instead of MagPresVote (see Appendix B for the full results of this, and the referendum 
model). 
Referendum Model 
The next model I tested evaluated Tufte’s referendum model, looking at the president’s 
approval rating and the percent change in total disposable income, both yearly and third quarter. 
I conducted eight tests of this model, with each test only looking at the midterm election years; 
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resulting in nineteen midterm elections examined (sixteen when PctChangInc3rd replaces 
PctChangInc; fifteen when ConsumerConf is included). 
Looking at the correlation matrix for this model, there are three relationships whose p-
values are 0.05 or below. The first significant relationship that appears is the relationship 
between HouseSeatGain and PresApproval. This relationship has a Pearson correlation value of 
0.506, and a p-value of 0.027. Another significant relationship that appears is the relationship 
between Party and PcyChangInc3rd. This relationship has a Pearson correlation value of 0.639, 
and a p-value of 0.008. The third and final significant relationship in this matrix is the 
relationship between ConsumerConf and PctChangInc. This relationship has a Pearson 
correlation value of 0.675, and a p-value of 0.006. I will be paying close attention to these three 
relationships in the following regression tests. 
Based on the correlation matrix, I again ran eight tests, following the same method as the 
surge-and-decline model. The test that appears to be the representative of the referendum model 
is the test in which the independent variables are PresApproval, PctChangInc, ConsumerConf, 
and Party. This model has an adjusted R square value of 0.675, with a p-value of 0.003. 
PresApproval has a coefficient value of 153.351, a standardized coefficient value of 0.608, and a 
p-value of 0.004. PctChangInc has a coefficient value of 7.412, a standardized coefficient value 
of 0.607, and a p-value of 0.030. ConsumerConf has a coefficient value of 0.120, a standardized 
coefficient value of 0.070, and a p-value of 0.761. Finally, Party has a coefficient value of -
21.114, a standardized coefficient value of -0.473, and a p-value of 0.029. 
The results of this test, and the other seven tests revealed interesting information. First, 
PresApproval is a very significant variable. In seven out of eight tests, PresApproval’s p-value 
was below 0.05. Therefore, how the public perceive the job the president is doing will have an 
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effect on the performance of his party in the midterm election. However, the president’s approval 
rating is only one-half of the equation. There is still the matter of the economy. The tests also 
show that when considering PctChangInc and PctChangInc3rd independently, the latter variable 
is better variable to represent the economy than the former. However, when adding 
ConsumerConf to the model, PctChangInc is now a better representative of the economy than 
PctChangInc3rd. Speaking of ConsumerConf, although the variable’s p-value never reaches 0.05 
or below, it is still an important variable when considering how the economy factors into 
midterm elections. Therefore, when considering the percent change in total disposable income 
per capita, the yearly annual change is a better variable to use than the third quarter annual 
change. 
Based on all of the results my presidential model will reflect the following: 
 Model #1 will incorporate HouseSeatGain only. 
 Model #2 will incorporate HouseSeatGain, PresVote, and Party. 
 Model #3 will incorporate HouseSeatGain, PresApproval, PctChangInc, 
ConsumerConf, and Party. 
Presidential Election Model 
In order to incorporate the midterm theories into the presidential model accurately, I 
made several changes to the midterm models. First, I lagged PresVote to represent the incumbent 
president’s, share of the popular vote in the previous presidential election. Second, I lagged 
HouseSeatGain to represent the incumbent party’s performance in the previous midterm election. 
Third, PctChangInc now represents the change in total disposable income per capita from the 
previous year. Fourth, and finally, ConsumerConf is the average of the values taken the year 
prior to the presidential election. PresApproval is the only variable not lagged in any fashion. 
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In the correlation matrix, the only relationship that has a significant correlation is the 
relationship between PresReelect and PresApproval. For this relationship, the Pearson 
correlation value was 0.619, and a p-value of 0.006. In regards to HouseSeatGain, the main 
variable of concern for this model, the Pearson correlation value for HouseSeatGain and 
PresReelect is -0.070, but its p-value is 0.777, well above the 0.05 statistical significance 
thresholds. 
After running all three tests of the model, including a number of variations of each test, 
there were no tests where the variables reached statistical significance. The test in which 
HouseSeatGain was the closest to statistical significance was a test that incorporated the 
variables HouseSeatGain, PresApproval, PctChangInc, and ConsumerConf. In this test, 
HouseSeatGain had a coefficient value of 0.030, an odds ratio of 1.031, and a p-value of 0.411. 
PresApproval had a coefficient value of 12.405, an odds ratio of 244012.456, and a p-value of 
0.336. PctChangInc had a coefficient value of 0.450, an odds ratio of 1.569, and a p-value of 
0.580. Finally, ConsumerConf had a coefficient value of 0.011, an odds ratio of 1.011, and a p-
value of 0.896. In terms of the model as a whole, this model had a chi-square value of 9.361, and 
a p-value of 0.053. 
Based on the results of my presidential model, it appears as though the theories used to 
predict midterm elections are not applicable to presidential elections. However, if these theories 
are not applicable to predict presidential elections, then what factors need consideration when 
predicting presidential elections? 
Evaluating the Theories 
Surge-and-Decline Theory 
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The president’s share of the popular vote is the foundation of the surge-and-decline 
theory. According to the results, no statistically significant relationship exists between the 
president’s share of the popular vote, and the number of U.S. House seats his party will lose, or 
gain, in the next midterm election. Compared with the referendum theory, surge-and-decline 
holds a unique advantage. Whereas the referendum theory is limited in the number of elections 
examined due to limited data availability, surge-and-decline is not limited. This allows me to 
expand the period, and include cases prior to 1936. Thus, I ran another model similar to the one 
ran earlier representing the surge-and-decline theory. The expectation is that if more cases are 
included, then the results of this model will be an improvement over the model ran earlier. The 
dependent variable is still HouseSeatGain, and the independent variables are PresVote and 
Party; but this model includes midterm elections from 1862 to 1934. After running this model, 
the results were as followed. First, the correlations between PresVote, Party, and 
HouseSeatGain, were weaker than the correlations in the first model. In terms of the actual 
equation, the adjusted R square value was -0.015, and its p-value was 0.487. PresVote had a 
coefficient value of -81.750, a standardized coefficient value of -0.145, and a p-value of 0.391. 
Party had a coefficient value of -9.700, a standardized coefficient value of -0.949, and a p-value 
of 0.349.Compared with the earlier model, this model is a worse representative of surge-and-
decline. Thus, surge-and-decline does not fit the overall trend of the president’s party losing 
congressional seats in midterm elections. 
The underlying principle behind the theory of surge and decline is that certain forces 
present in a presidential election are absent in a midterm election, results in lower turnout and a 
loss of congressional seats for the president’s party. However, I fail to see the reason as to why 
the president’s share of the popular vote from his election is comparable to the number of seats 
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his party gains or lose in the subsequent midterm election, a la James E. Campbell (1991). 
Studying the relationship between presidential popular vote and midterm losses undertakes the 
assumption that the president’s popular vote would be the same in the midterm election as it was 
in the previous presidential election. This is not the case, however. Instead, the moving parts that 
resulted in the president’s victory begin to shift again at about the same time the president takes 
office and begins to make decisions. Because the president is on the ballot every four years, there 
has to be a method in place to gauge the public’s attitude towards the president; thus explains the 
role of the presidential approval poll, one of the underpinnings of the referendum theory. 
Based on the results presented in this research, and taking into account the error of 
evaluating the president’s popular vote, it is said with confidence the theory of surge-and-decline 
is dead. 
Referendum Theory 
Although the period of the referendum theory is limited due to unavailability of data 
regarding president’s approval rating and requisite economic data, it is still a better explainer 
than the surge-and-decline theory as to why the president’s party loses congressional seats. The 
president’s approval rating is, according to the data, the strongest variable available to predict 
whether the president’s party will lose or gain seats. 
There has been numerous literature published on the role of the economy in elections 
(Kramer 1971; Stigler 1973; Tufte 1975, 814). On its own, the annual percent change of total 
disposable income per capita, for the election year, is not a statistically significant variable. 
However, when the consumer confidence index for the third quarter of the election year is 
included, then the percent change variable becomes statistically significant. However, the p-
value for the variable representing consumer confidence never reaches the 0.05 threshold. 
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However, the inclusion of this variable in the overall equation is necessary. This is because the 
economy is considered as an intervening variable; it has an effect on both the president’s 
approval rating and the results of the election. A figurative explanation of the role of the 






The role of the economy in Tufte’s referendum model is transposable onto elections in 
general. The economy plays a role in both the midterm election and the presidential election. 









Although the referendum cannot serve as the foundation of a presidential model that 
incorporates midterm election results, it does not necessarily follow that the theory as a whole is 














what factors from the referendum theory, and possibly any outside factors, deserve consideration 
when creating a presidential election model.  
Presidential Model 
For this presidential model, none of the variables included reached the appropriate levels 
of statistical significance. Now it is time to turn attention to what factors need consideration 
when predicting presidential elections. Based on the results from this research, the first factor to 
consider when predicting presidential elections is the president’s approval rating. Located on the 
next page is a graph displaying the probability an incumbent president, or the incumbent party, 
has of retaining the White House, given a certain approval rating. 
The graph measures the president’s approval rating in the last Gallup poll prior to the 
election, against the average predicted probabilities of the president’s reelection chances. For 
example, a president with an approval rating of 70 percent has, according to the graph, a 95% 
chance of winning reelection. Contrarily, a president with an approval rating of 34 percent only 
has a 12 percent chance of winning reelection. In the graph, the inflection point of the graph is 
located between 45 and 51 percent. That means somewhere between these two percentages, the 
incumbent president’s chances of reelection are 50 percent. This graph holds true to the idea that 
presidents with an approval rating below 50 percent prior to Election Day will lose reelection. 
This was the case for Gerald Ford, whose approval rating was 45 percent when he lost to Jimmy 
Carter in 1976. Jimmy Carter’s approval rating was 37 percent going into the 1980 election, 
when he lost to Ronald Reagan. George H.W. Bush lost to Bill Clinton in 1992 with a pre-
Election Day approval rating of 34 percent. The only exception to this rule is Harry S. Truman in 





Another factor that deserves consideration deals with the issue(s) determining the 
election. Sometimes, the most important issue is the economy; other times, foreign policy is the 
top issue. For example, the 1968 presidential election the deciding issue was the Vietnam War. 
The 2004 presidential election focused mainly on the War on Terrorism, especially in the last 
days of campaigning with the release of a video recording of Osama bin Laden the weekend 




One other factor deserving attention is the off years of the presidential term. Elections 
work in the following sequence: 
 
If it is the case presidential elections are a referendum on the president’s term in office, 
then voters will consider years three and four of the presidential term than years one and two. If a 
presidential model incorporates this idea, the accuracy of the model will head in the correct 
direction. 
Conclusion 
According to the results, it seems as though midterm elections have no bearing on 
subsequent presidential elections. This is important because this means that Congress has no 
coattails for the president to run on, or that the decisions, or lack of decisions, made by the 
Congress have no direct effect on presidential elections. However, why is it the case Congress 
has no coattails? Although Congress is composed of 535 unique individuals, it is also comprised 
of two distinct political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. The political fortunes of the 
president, and the political fortunes of his fellow party members in Congress should be one-in-
the same. The best indicator for this dynamic is Congress’s approval rating. However, only nine 
presidential elections have a recorded Congressional approval rating. As time progresses, I am 
confident researchers will be able to determine whether there is a relationship between 









Gary C. Jacobsen and Samuel Kernell said midterm elections provide an interesting 
testing ground for theories regarding voting and elections in the United States (1983, 60). I am in 
complete agreement with this statement. As political scientists continue to construct models to 
predict presidential and midterm elections, it is my hope that any theory crafted will explain the 
trends that make American politics unlike anything else in the world. For example, future studies 
might take Tufte’s referendum model, substitute the president’s approval rating for Congress’s 
approval rating, and instead of determining changes in the composition of the U.S. House of 




Appendix A – Correlation Matrices 
Midterm Election: Surge-and-Decline Theory 
 
Correlations 
 HouseSeatGain Party PresVote MagPresVote PartyIDD PartyIDR 
HouseSeatGain 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.376 -.390 -.400 -.016 .159 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .112 .099 .090 .956 .570 
N 19 19 19 19 15 15 
Party 
Pearson Correlation -.376 1 -.072 -.063 -.121 -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .112  .768 .798 .667 .979 
N 19 19 19 19 15 15 
PresVote 
Pearson Correlation -.390 -.072 1 .999
**
 .342 -.444 
Sig. (2-tailed) .099 .768  .000 .212 .098 
N 19 19 19 19 15 15 
MagPresVote 
Pearson Correlation -.400 -.063 .999
**
 1 .346 -.447 
Sig. (2-tailed) .090 .798 .000  .206 .095 
N 19 19 19 19 15 15 
PartyIDD 
Pearson Correlation -.016 -.121 .342 .346 1 -.674
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .956 .667 .212 .206  .006 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
PartyIDR 
Pearson Correlation .159 -.007 -.444 -.447 -.674
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .570 .979 .098 .095 .006  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 





Midterm Election: Referendum Theory 
 
Correlations 
 HouseSeatGain Party PresApproval PctChangInc PctChangInc3rd ConsumerConf 
HouseSeatGain 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.376 .506
*
 .288 .131 .478 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .112 .027 .232 .629 .072 
N 19 19 19 19 16 15 
Party 
Pearson Correlation -.376 1 -.201 .248 .639
**
 .325 
Sig. (2-tailed) .112  .410 .307 .008 .238 




 -.201 1 .284 -.276 .250 
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .410  .239 .301 .369 
N 19 19 19 19 16 15 
PctChangInc 





Sig. (2-tailed) .232 .307 .239  .000 .006 
N 19 19 19 19 16 15 
PctChangInc3rd 







Sig. (2-tailed) .629 .008 .301 .000  .003 
N 16 16 16 16 16 15 
ConsumerConf 





Sig. (2-tailed) .072 .238 .369 .006 .003  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 








 Party PresReelect HouseSeatGain PresVote PresApproval PctChangInc ConsumerConf 
Party 
Pearson Correlation 1 .045 -.365 .003 .075 .031 -.100 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .855 .124 .991 .766 .904 .723 
N 19 19 19 19 18 18 15 
PresReelect 







Sig. (2-tailed) .855  .777 .567 .006 .015 .031 
N 19 19 19 19 18 18 15 
HouseSeatGain 
Pearson Correlation -.365 -.070 1 -.459
*
 .063 -.078 .223 
Sig. (2-tailed) .124 .777  .048 .804 .759 .425 
N 19 19 19 19 18 18 15 
PresVote 
Pearson Correlation .003 -.140 -.459
*
 1 -.030 .191 -.031 
Sig. (2-tailed) .991 .567 .048  .905 .448 .913 
N 19 19 19 19 18 18 15 
PresApproval 
Pearson Correlation .075 .619
**





Sig. (2-tailed) .766 .006 .804 .905  .002 .003 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 15 
PctChangInc 
Pearson Correlation .031 .561
*





Sig. (2-tailed) .904 .015 .759 .448 .002  .041 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 15 
ConsumerConf 
Pearson Correlation -.100 .556
*





Sig. (2-tailed) .723 .031 .425 .913 .003 .041  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix B – Surge-and-Decline Results 

































Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 






 .317 .231 20.857 2.328 
a. Predictors: (Constant), PresVote, Party 





Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 3225.734 2 1612.867 3.708 .048
b
 
Residual 6959.950 16 434.997   
Total 10185.684 18    
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain 





Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 78.148 49.229  1.587 .132 
Party -18.854 9.608 -.407 -1.962 .067 
PresVote -185.533 91.608 -.420 -2.025 .060 





 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -54.07 -2.37 -29.74 13.387 19 
Residual -33.514 35.989 .000 19.664 19 
Std. Predicted Value -1.817 2.044 .000 1.000 19 
Std. Residual -1.607 1.726 .000 .943 19 









































Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 






 .322 .237 20.782 2.325 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MagPresVote, Party 







 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -54.31 -2.29 -29.74 13.490 19 
Residual -33.780 35.898 .000 19.593 19 
Std. Predicted Value -1.822 2.035 .000 1.000 19 
Std. Residual -1.625 1.727 .000 .943 19 







Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 3275.750 2 1637.875 3.793 .045
b
 
Residual 6909.934 16 431.871   
Total 10185.684 18    
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain 







Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -14.717 7.484  -1.966 .067 
Party -18.688 9.567 -.403 -1.953 .069 
MagPresVote -188.345 91.390 -.425 -2.061 .056 










































Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 






 .768 .675 12.900 2.440 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ConsumerConf, PresApproval, Party, PctChangInc 







 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -55.24 10.57 -24.33 19.837 15 
Residual -15.568 17.844 .000 10.902 15 
Std. Predicted Value -1.558 1.759 .000 1.000 15 
Std. Residual -1.207 1.383 .000 .845 15 







Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 5509.242 4 1377.310 8.277 .003
b
 
Residual 1664.091 10 166.409   
Total 7173.333 14    
a. Dependent Variable: HouseSeatGain 







Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -120.888 32.610  -3.707 .004 
Party -21.114 8.309 -.473 -2.541 .029 
PresApproval 153.351 41.937 .608 3.657 .004 
PctChangInc 7.412 2.938 .607 2.522 .030 
ConsumerConf .120 .385 .070 .313 .761 





Appendix D – Presidential Model Results 
































Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step .856 3 .836 
Block .856 3 .836 







 Observed Predicted 
 PresReelect Percentage 
Correct  0 1 
Step 1 
PresReelect 
0 2 6 25.0 
1 1 10 90.9 
Overall Percentage   63.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
  
Variables in the Equation 




HouseSeatGain -.018 .027 .425 1 .514 .982 
Party -.085 1.029 .007 1 .935 .919 
PresVote -8.972 10.832 .686 1 .408 .000 
Constant 4.641 5.530 .705 1 .401 103.699 





Step -2 Log 
likelihood 






 .044 .059 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 




































Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 11.460 5 .043 
Block 11.460 5 .043 







 Observed Predicted 
 PresReelect Percentage 
Correct  0 1 
Step 1 
PresReelect 
0 6 2 75.0 
1 1 6 85.7 
Overall Percentage   80.0 




Variables in the Equation 




HouseSeatGain -.034 .071 .230 1 .631 .967 
Party -3.100 3.598 .742 1 .389 .045 
PresApproval 17.067 15.671 1.186 1 .276 25816178.787 
PctChangInc .672 .880 .583 1 .445 1.957 
ConsumerConf .252 .325 .604 1 .437 1.287 
Constant -36.224 40.374 .805 1 .370 .000 






Step -2 Log 
likelihood 






 .534 .713 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 9 because 
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